fied in legal terms; a continuum existed in the typology of legal cases. 4 As Jewish (legal) history is multi-polar, with each legal case having to be regarded individually, the revolutionary year of 1917 can by no means be considered »zero hour«.
5 What happened to the highly complex and contradictory ›Law‹, or the Tsarist legislation of the Jews after 1917? In the turn to socialism, was a new beginning guaranteed, as Peter Stuchka , the leading figure of Soviet jurisprudence and legal theory of the 1920s, pointed out, »in a figurative sense of the word«, by »burning« the former law (in the shape of the sixteenth volume of the Legal Collection (Svod Zakonov) and the fourteenth volume of the Senat's Cassation decisions)?
6 Was the Russian jurisdiction of the Jews, which according to many contemporaries meant a »legislative pogrom«, the first victim in the fire of the Revolution?
7
The cases presented in this article prove a continuity of certain norms and practices between the Tsarist and the Soviet periods. In the end, Soviet jurisprudence, said to possess both a destructive and a constructive function, resembled a two-headed Janus. It had one face directed towards the past, which, in the case of the Jewish population was at least as meaningful as its other face pointing towards the future.
8 Unsurprisingly, as the majority of the Jews in the region remained traditionally observant, Jewish life in the early 20 th century was still strongly influenced by traditional Jewish law (halacha). As Michael Stanislawski states, the »vast majority of the Jews in Russia until 1917 (or in Poland to 1939) never became Zionists or Bundists or Autonomists or any other ›ists‹,« instead, they were leading traditional Jewish lives, »with one foot in their tradition and the other outside of it«. 9 The halacha was a point of reference both for the Jewish population and for the various governments before and after the Red October. The post-1917 government's overwhelmingly negative perceptions of traditional Jewish law is, in my view, one of the focal points for the continuity in the legal cases in Ukrainian-Jewish history. The next focal point is the lack of differentiation in the thinking and activities of diverse administrations with respect to the Jewish population. Even after 1917 the destructive effect of the Janus was not capable of destroying past ways of thinking about and treating the Jewish population in Ukraine.
In this article, I will focus on the following fields: the legal and political features that pertained to Jews living in Russia and Soviet
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Recherche 1988, 68). In 1932 passports with the column Natsional'nost' were introduced which expressed the Soviet national politics of the previous year. In 1934 the »Jewish Autonomous Republic« was proclaimed in Birobidzhan. In the legal sphere numerous obvious changes could also be observed. For example, in 1932 the meaning of the concept »speculation« (spekuliatsiia) was legally altered.
While in 1926 a »fraudulent overestimation of prices« (zlostnoe povyshenie tsen) was considered spekuliatsia, in 1932 »all forms of private trading prohibited by law« were regarded as spekuliatsia (see: Aron Trainin, Obshchee uchenie o sostave prestupleniia (1957) Ukraine; the tax on kosher meat (korobka) before and after 1917; the under participation of Jews in court cases; the development of legal terminology; and, finally, Jewish Lawyers in Russia and early Soviet Ukraine.
Status, Standards and Norms
According to the jurist Genrikh Sliozberg's (1863-1937) statement made in 1910, the Tsarist jurisdiction took care to »unite« (soedinit') the »destroyed edifice« (rassypannuiu khraminu) of the Russian Jewry. In Sliozberg's words, this edifice was »regarded by the law as a homogenous construction«.
10
Tsarist legislation on Jews was widely regarded as unjust. At the turn of the 20 th century the establishment of equality for the Jewish people before the law and emancipation were at the top of all Jewish political agendas. Therefore, Jewish »integrationists« found common ground with Bundists and Zionists who, each in their own way, championed for the rights of the Jewish people.
11
By creating an increasingly complicated system of laws pertaining to Jews, the Tsarist government produced hundreds of thousands of unprofessional legal experts without intending to do so.
12 Thus, the complex legal conditions under which the Jews lived rendered the acquisition of a practical knowledge of the law necessary for daily business and family life. At the beginning of the 20 th century the navigation of Tsarist laws on Jews nearly became an independent species within (also non-) Jewish jurisprudence.
13 Similarly, after the Red October Jewish legal scientists offered responses regarding the Russian, Ukrainian and, respectively, Soviet law to various sections of the Jewish population.
14 As the interpretive tradition is a continuous and essential element of Jewish traditional rabbinical culture, not only »progressive lawyers« 15 but also ordinary people reacted to and pondered law and administrative practice in Russia.
Since '- state. In other words, halacha was exercised by the rabbis of different Jewish communities with exclusive reference to affairs concerning family and religion. Here, the greatest importance was attached to the vertical movement of any given case from the province into the offices of the Department of the Interior in Petersburg. 16 The predestined route of a »Jewish case« broke through the »semantic unity« of the legal norms of halacha on its way to the administrative top in Petersburg. In this way, the religious law was continuously transformed and interpreted anew.
17 The political events of 1905 destroyed the unity of these legal norms, which had at least theoretically existed before. The »people's spring« of 1905 turned into the late fall of the Tsarist's legal jurisdiction over the Jewish people.
18 Subsequently, the events of the years 1914 and 1917 brought this process to a formal end. The Pale of Jewish settlement was a main characteristic of the Jewish legal situation in the Russian Empire, with its demise in 1917 the entire system of Jewish jurisdiction ceased to exist.
According to Russian law, before 1917 Jews were considered to be »alien born« (inorodtsy), which was more of a »legal marker of racial difference« than an »indicator of a given people's purported level of civilized development«.
19 Like other non-Christian denominations, Judaism was defined as a foreign confession. The ethnic classification of Jews as a nationality (nation) was only seriously considered by the government after the Revolutions of 1917. First the independent Ukrainian government granted Jewish national-cultural autonomy, later, following Stalin's definition, the Bolsheviks recognized the Jews as a nation. By being constantly reproduced in the official and private documents of the Jewish population, the »baroque lexicon« of the legal and political features of the Jews in Imperial Russia and the early Soviet Union became part of the Jewish legal consciousness.
20
However, the semantics which espoused the social prestige of Jews, for the most part, only provided a linguistic framework for their legal culture. Behind this framework, real Jewish life, in the shape of uncountable legal cases, was hidden. The dynamics of Jewish life were dramatic and, at this time, hardly had any con- nection to the legal decrees which recognized the rights of Jews.
21
For instance, the law regarding the autonomy of Jewish communities, which for the period was surprisingly progressive, was never effectively implemented. Thus, the theory of Jewish autonomism was met by the praxis of absolute lawlessness and pogroms.
22
The search for a certain degree of stability to compensate for the daily turbulence and the rapidly changing legal norms was another characteristic of the legal consciousness and behavior of Jews during this period, summarized in the expression »new laws and old men«. 23 In other words, the rapid development of legal norms concerning the Jewish population between 1915 and 1925 led to a situation in which the »old men« were no longer able to keep pace with societal transformation. Although the »old men« were concerned with carrying on with normal life, after 1917 »the standards and norms were dictated by the new circumstances«.
24
In 1923, the year of radical persecutions through the »servants of the cult«, an entry was made in Pinkas, the community register of a synagogue in Kiev, which tells of the purchase of two tablecloths, a larger one for the Bima (Ambon) and a smaller one for a different table.
25 The »old men« tried to gain some stability in an extremely drastic situation. But the non-consideration didn't help.
The numerous continuities between Russian law and Soviet legality revealed themselves in the legal conflicts dealing with Jews in the early 20 th century. In late Imperial Russia, ›law‹ was a »method of communicating demarcations of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, rather than a mechanism for the protection of the rights of citizens.« 26 An efficient and well-structured administration was part of the state's behaviour towards ›their‹ Jews, in which the role of the executive, either of the offices of the respective Governor in the Russian Empire or of the executive committees (Ispolkoms) in the Soviet Union, was equally important. Legal matters resolved outside the courts (for instance decisions regarding various public petitions) also continuously gained significance.
27
As Otto Mayer, one of the founders of German theory of administrative law said, »Constitutions come and go -administrations stay« (Verfassung vergeht -Verwaltung besteht). 28 In Ukraine, constitutions disappeared and the names and the ideological contents of the organs of the administration also changed, but the interactions between the Jewish population and the relevant offi- ces, and the typology of the cases that came in to question, did not. Ideas about certain Jewish religious and social practices proved to be transportable from one political regime to the next and, thus, found their place in »socialist legality«. 29 In imperial Russia legal administration was, especially in cases related to Jews, »above the law« (vyshe zakona) and had »pre-eminence before the courts«.
30
Therefore, it is understandable that in an article written by a liberal jurist in the early 20 th century, legality (zakonnost') was described as »self-restriction of power«.
31 The development of the Soviet Union marked a new understanding of the concept of »legality« -socialist legality. However, the actual functions in reference to the Jewish population, in many respects, remained the same.
The reasons for trials concerning Jews were not as important as the organization of the Jewish courts and the information which had to be reported to their superiors -the Committee of national minorities (Natsmen committee) in the executive committees, Ispolkoms.
32 Jewish courts in the Ukraine were involved in the administrative system and, therefore, became part of the construction of the ›Jewish nation‹ in Soviet Ukraine.
Korobka before and after 1917
The tax on kosher meat in the Russian Empire (korobochnyj sbor) is one example reflecting both the continuity and change within legal and administrative matters pertaining to Jews during the first third of the 20 th century. This tax was unofficially called the korobka and before 1917 was at the core of both internal Jewish debates and discussions within the Russian government.
Rabbis, mainly from the Ukrainian province, expressed their opinion on the tax in various letters and petitions to the Rabbinical Commission, which commenced its activities in Petersburg in 1910.
33 While on one side, opponents of the tax argued that the korobka only further burdened the poorer sections of the population and rendered it impossible for them to nourish themselves according to religious laws, on the other side, proponents argued that the tax ensured the existence of Jewish religious institutions and, thereby, compliance with religious laws. (1910) argued for the abolition of this tax, despite remaining ambivalent to the benefits of doing so. V. T. Freidenberg, for example, pointed out that in Warsaw the money from the korobka was not used for religious and practical necessities (nuzhdy) and, consequently, there was no public Talmud-Torah (Jewish school for boys). 35 According to Shmarya Levin (1867-1935), a Zionist political activist and rabbi of Ekaterinoslav and later of Vilna, a »direct income and progressive tax« (priamoi podokhodnyi progressivnyi nalog) was a good alternative to the korobka, but would only be practical in the future. In general the convention's participants argued that the korobka had to be abolished, yet only gradually. 36 The dominant position taken amongst the participants was already expressed in Mendele Mocher Sforim's (Sholem Y. Abramovich) play Di takse (The Tax, 1869). In reaction to a rumour that the korobka was to be abolished, the hero of the play, Spodek, states: »Yes, that would be a real calamity. My word, it's the cashbox that keeps alive the last bit of Jewishness, isn't it?«
37
On November 26 th , 1913, 66 members of the Russian Duma issued a Bill (Zakonodatel'noe predpolozhenie) pleading for the prompt abolition of the korobka, which, it was argued, supposedly favoured Jewish »ritualists« and butchers. The religious way of slaughtering (uboi skota) was not to be tolerated due to its »school of cruelty« (shkola izuverstva), especially not »in our time, the time of people's unruliness (dichaniia) and a threatening growth in the number of crimes.« 38 The abolition of the korobka, the members of the Duma argued, was, moreover, an »urgent demand of public hygiene« because non-Jews buying meat with one of the eight »damages« (povrezhdenii), which render it unkosher (trefe), would be exposed to deadly risk.
39 This line of argumentation, to be sure, not especially consequential.
Mixed opinions on the korobka developed as early as 1835 when the government made the tax obligatory for local communities; hitherto this enforcement, the tax had been voluntary (samooblozhenie). Accordingly, the Jewish politician Shtern from Odessa was of the opinion that the korobka had to be maintained because it offered Jewish communities the possibility to pay taxes (povinnosti) owed to the government in smaller amounts (pogashat'). On the other hand, as was emphasized by Shtern, the tax was a nuisance to the common people because the meat tax was released in lease (na otkup). monopolist, often leading to inner-Jewish conflicts.
40 For example, in 1910 the butchers in Boguslav near Kiev did not pay the excise duty on kosher meat to the lessee, instead they threatened him and demanded to obtain the rest of the meat on long term credit. These »people gorged with blood«, the lessee wrote in his petition, had already been ordered to peace court and deserved to be punished. In this case, however, the state confiscated all property of the leaser Mordko Staviskii.
41
Although the korobka was abolished in 1917, it continued living in people's minds and was often seen as a legal reference for the Jewish community's relations with the state. Soviet legislation stipulated that the state's revenue from the butchering of animals and birds was to be the same from any group in the Soviet population. In 1927-28 representatives of the Odessa Jewish community presented a petition to the executive organs mentioning that the government was planning to restitute the abolished korobka, which would lead to the closure of various butcheries. This would constitute -in the argument of the representatives of the Odessa community -considerable damage to the Jewish religion. Is it legitimate, the community asked, »in light of the legislation about the separation of church and state, for the state to interfere in religious matters and profit from a religious ritual?« 42 Attached was a letter from the shokhetim (Russian: rezniki), who were responsible for the kosher butchering of animals. As »servitors of a religious cult« the shokhetim were being deprived of their civil rights and were classified as »aliens« (lishentsy). 43 In their letter they argued that the specificity of shokhets' activities were not religious in nature, but rather scientific or veterinary. Indeed, a shokhet has to say a prayer but not a prayer that endows the animal's body with a kosher character; above all, they argued, this is an anatomical test of the animal and not a ritual action. The kashrut depends not on »God« but on the »veterinary care« of the experts.
44 This conflict called the Tsarist legislation on the korobka into remembrance.
45
Remembering and drawing from a past law when outlining succeeding legislative steps is common practice.
46 However, the gap opened by the incorporation of Jewish religious law into Russian legislation was huge and the memory of Jewish law reached far beyond the current legal environment.
47 A long time after the abolition of the korobka, this »memory« (the shokhetim's reflection on the korobka and the kashrut rules) remained a political issue. Is it possible to identify ›Jewish‹ court cases?
In the early Soviet time, civil and criminal cases involving Jews were sometimes transformed into ›Jewish cases‹. The legal or ideological characterisation of a case, I argue, established it as a Jewish matter or not.
48 Without a doubt, the pre-revolutionary trials connected with pogroms, accusations of ritual murder or with anti-Semitic riots can be defined as ›Jewish‹ (or better ›anti-Jewish‹) cases. But this leaves the question whether there were crimes of a ›general nature‹ which mostly involved Jews. For Russia and the early Soviet Ukraine there are no specific statistics available.
Statistics do exist, however, for Poland in the 1920-30s, where the illegal activities in question were also typical of the Jewish milieu in Russia before 1917. These illegal activities include: official malfeasance, financial infringements (mostly bribes and speculations) and cases connected with the illegal registration of people.
Comparable to Imperial Russia and the Soviet Ukraine, the Polish statistics reveal that capital crimes (especially murders) were rarer in the Jewish than in the non-Jewish milieu. Indeed, in Jewish communities they were three times rarer than in the former Russian territories and six times rarer than in Galicia. The same can be found for plundering (razboi). In Jewish communities plundering occurred four times less often than in the former Russian territories and 25 times less often than in Galicia. 52 But what about the other cases beyond the national legal organizations (Sudebnye kamery) which involved Jews? As argued here, one has to proceed on a case by case basis.
In 1927 the Yiddish newspaper »Der Shtern« reported that a district court in Khar'kov had reached a verdict concerning the heads (makores) of a textile syndicate.
53 All the makores were given prison sentences ranging from 18 months to three years for bribing and, respectively, taking bribes and the gut-brudershaft. Only half of the accused were Jewish, yet the case won the attention of the Jewish press and was granted a great deal of space in a Jewish newspaper. Through the attention given to the case through the Jewish newspaper, the »mixed« case was rendered Jewish.
The administration of Jews as a nation and a national minority during the time of »Soviet international nationalism« reflected a change, cases suddenly assumed national (read: Jewish) character.
54
Language as an Impetus for Change? Two Dictionaries
In 1926 and in 1941 two legal dictionaries were published, neither of which were ever used in everyday practice. The first dictionary, the Russian-Ukrainian dictionary of legal terminology, published by Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi (1871-1941), became a victim of the Sovietization and Russification of legal terminology. The second dictionary, in which linguist Elie Spivak (1891 Spivak ( -1950 
55
collected Russian-Yiddish legal and administrative lexicon, was published only months before the extinction of the majority of its potential users -the Yiddish-speaking population of the Ukraine.
56
The editors and authors of the Russian-Ukrainian dictionary stressed the importance of the vocabulary's Ukrainian spirit and intentionally romanticized expressions. Kryms'kyi emphasized the significance of the fact that the dictionary contained »words which hitherto had beautifully (liubisen'ko) lived on in the tongues of the Ukrainian people«. The authors were concerned with the demand to reactivate the outdated Ukrainian legal language (the language (1929-30) , a group of Ukrainian intellectuals, amongst them the authors of the dictionary, were accused of being faithful to the old agrarian Ukraine, »dotted with farmsteads and manor houses«, and of misunderstanding »Soviet-Ukrainization«. 58 In other words, the authorities of Soviet-Ukraine believed that Europeanized and Latinized Russian legal terminology should be the basis for a Ukrainian understanding of law.
59
Elie Spivak, the author of the Russian-Yiddish dictionary, called the search for patterns in the history of Jewish law a futile undertaking, even more so because in the mid-1930s a heated political-scientific battle in the language of the national minorities was being led against the national samobytnost (specificity) discourse.
60 According to Spivak Yiddish, legal terminology in Soviet Ukraine should be based on different principles. In his dictionary the author explicitly wishes to Latinize and Russianize Yiddish. Spivak was concerned with creating a Jewish legal language which was Jewish only in its formal aspects (using Hebrew letters and a Yiddish-Germanic basis) and socialistic in its content. For him this meant the elimination of vocabulary based on foreign languages (»alien words«, slova-inorodtsy) -an obvious allusion to Jewish people's legal status in the Russian Empire. The words were rooted in (ukorenilis') and therefore corresponded to their new socialistic meanings.
61
It was Spivak's intention that legal-administrative terminology be the »generally used vocabulary« in the time of »political knowledge« for all sections of the population. 62 In contrast to »archaic Ukrainisms«, Hebrewisms should only appear where absolutely necessary. It was clearly important to opgrentsen (dissociate oneself) from archaic Hebrew expressions, which »still prevailed« post-1917. 63 Spivak argued, however, that a certain number of words and expressions from traditional Jewish law should be used, in particular, those words which were »rooted« (ukorenilis') in the Hebrew language. These included: get (letter of a divorce), gegeter (divorced person) and gemishpetkait (previous conviction) (sudimost'). 65 More importantly, Spivak argued that behind each national (linguistic) conscience equality is hidden and only partially based on analogisms. Determining the relationship of one language towards another at the cultural and political meta-level are necessary. 66 The experience of the Soviet-Ukrainian courts provided him with material to test his hypotheses.
For instance, in a murder trial in Khar'kov in 1927 the lawyers informed the accused woman that she had not committed an act of retaliation but an akt fun meschugas (act of insanity). However, no word for insanity (nevmenjaemost') appeared in the newspaper article in 1927. 67 Practical and administrative necessities were taken into consideration in Spivak's dictionary of legal and administrative lexicon (maybe after Spivak had read the newspaper article), so nevmeniaemost' is translated as unfarantwortfeikeyt in the dictionary. The German-Latin word -as a sign of advanced Sovietization -thereby replaced the Yiddish colloquial word meschugas.
68
The language politics regarding Yiddish legal terminology, in which Elie Spivak played an active part, became another example of the ›two-headed Janus‹ of Soviet legal jurisdiction. In this case, the face towards the future was dominant. The declaration of (linguistic) equality radicalized the concept of reconciliation between the Jewish and the autochthonous populations, which was rooted in the Russian debates of the 19 th century. 69 Despite this, the Soviet jurisdiction over class and the Soviet »politics of voice« were declared the only valid »law«. 70 The past was meaningless, especially when rooted in the Rabbinical-Hebrew tradition, and had to be left behind. According to this way of thinking there was no Jewish legal history apart from the history of legislative persecutions and archaic traditional law. There was only the present day with its tangible legal and political claims. The logic of Spivak's dictionary was more than a result of the repressive politics of the Stalin government and more than just another example of the »non-Jewish« (Isaac Deutscher), i. e. assimilated, Jewry. 71 Spivak's dictionary represented the communist fear of a continuity of legal ideas and the transferring of the ›outdated‹ into the present. This is probably the reason that the word ›rabbi‹ (ravvin) was missing in the Russian-Yiddish dictionary although this word did appear in the new Soviet Russian-Ukrainian dictionary.
Jewish Lawyers: Definition and Ethnicity
In the case of Russian-Jewish lawyers pre-1917 and during emigration post-1917, one Janus face was constantly looking backwards. In the past, one was searching mainly for parallels between the principles of the legal reform of 1864 and current legal realitiy -as a pre-revolutionary advocate (either Jewish or nonJewish) one was the child and the follower of the 1864 reform. In 1950, lawyer Boris Gershun (1870-1954) gave a speech in the »Jewish Palestinian Agency« in Tel Aviv in memory of Oskar Gruzenberg (1866-1940). In his eulogy he emphasized that Gruzenberg had been a Russian lawyer who »during the Russian period of his life had helped the Jews in his profession of Russian advocate«.
72
Ideas of this kind granted the advocates of the early 20 th century a liberal, yet imperial identity -the lawyers of the Tsarist era frequently had a critical attitude towards independent Ukraine.
73
During the »icy December« of 1917 jurist Dmitrii Avdeenko hurried to a court conference in Kherson. In Sobornaia square he saw horsemen dressed in Ukrainian clothes: »What kind of masquerade is this? -I asked the judge K. Are they shooting a cinéma picture? Oh no, he responded laughingly. Since yesterday the city has been occupied by Ukrainians«.
74
In April 1917 attorney Alexei Gol'denveizer (1890-1979) spoke of a »hypnosis« of Ukrainian independence, which was not to be mistaken with the reality of a country ignorant of federalism. It was in the best interests of the Jews to resist the revolutionary zeal of Ukrainian independence. 75 Likewise conceptions of an ideal Russian legal representation were preserved post-1917. Gol'denveizer had been working in Berlin as an advocate since 1923. He recorded his thoughts on the topic in one of his notebooks: »After two years of working in Berlin my general conclusion is definitely a negative one: For a Russian attorney, that is an attorney in the true sense of the word, neither a broker nor a commerçant, soon there will be nothing left to do. The Russian clients will learn to be satisfied only with German attorneys who are not really up to date but who know the local conditions well […] .«
76
The jurists' networks in Soviet Ukraine were created to further common research and work in the Russian empire. The non-Jewish lawyer Valentin Lekhno described his odyssey in the Ukraine be-
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A Two-Headed Janus: Continuity and Change within the Legal History of Jews in Ukraine, 1905 Ukraine, -1932 tween 1918 and 1922. With a plan to escape from the Soviet Ukraine, Lekhno was still trying to climb the Bolshevik ladder. He was helped mainly by his Jewish colleagues with whom he had studied in Khar'kov prior to 1917 and who were now working for Soviet legal institutions. Here the feeling of belonging to a group or a »guild« was clearly dominant.
77
Despite a tendency to romanticize the situation of Jewish lawyers in pre-revolutionary Russia, the reality was quite difficult. Since 1889 »people of non-Christian confessions« needed to receive special permission from the Minister of Justice before they could be accepted as sworn attorneys (prisiazhnye poverennye). During the fifteen years following 1889 no Jew was given the status of prisiazhnye poverennye, resulting in a professional crisis for thousands of legal graduates.
78 This situation continued until the »era of confidence« when, after the assassination of Pleve (1904), the Minister of the Interior, Prince Sviatopolk-Mirskii was appointed as his successor. After the Manifest of October 17, 1905 Jewish attorney assistants were accepted as prisiazhnye poverennye without further hindrance. This practice continued until 1908 when Jewish ›attorney assistants‹ were again deprived of their legal rights and were prohibited to become sworn attorneys.
Before 1917, which factors made a lawyer of Jewish origin a ›Jewish lawyer‹?
79 On the Russian-Jewish side, Genrikh Sliozberg referred to a connection between his intense Talmud studies as a 10 year-old boy with his ability as a grown man and lawyer to analyse different points of view and to find their synthesis.
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A different testimony was provided by German-Jewish attorney Hermann Staub (1856-1904) who talked about ›his‹ method of commenting on merchant law: »My way of presenting is the Talmudic one«. 81 In Sliozberg's as well as in Staub's case we are confronted with a slightly romanticized sacralisation of their past. In fact, while the Talmudic argumentation and Jewish law always remained a fascinating subject for them, it remained only a fascinating subject and nothing more. By emphasising the positive aspects they encountered in their religious tradition, for instance by making Talmudic references, Jewish lawyers tried to balance exclusion and the mainstream negative opinion associated with Judaism. Amongst these positive aspects, Sliozberg counted, for example, the plurality of the Talmud, which facilitated and even embraced many different opinions about one topic. During World War I the rabbis and lawyers from the Ukrainian province turned to the attorney and state delegate Duma Naftali Fridman (1863-1921) with their concerns. The tone of these letters was always very similar: Fridman was continuously addressed as »delegate and Jew« and as »representative of our people« in Petersburg. It was not relevant that one case was about the renewal of the licences of hundreds of Jewish attorneys and the other about the exemption of Ukrainian rabbis from the draft. 82 This example exemplifies a shift in representation, as the Jewish community started to turn to attorneys in the »court of gentiles« (Benjamin Nathans) rather than to rabbis in the rabbinical court (Beit Din). The attorneys represented a »professionalization of shtadlanut« -Jewish political representation -which many of them regarded as an activity in accordance with the ideas of Russian legal reform. 84 But together with new post-1917 restrictions, the self-attribution of »Jewish jurists« was made superfluous as Soviet lawyers entered the scene. 85 Indeed, the extremely negative relationship between the authorities and the bar continued post-1917. In unofficial newspaper articles and documents the bar (advokatura) in the early Soviet Union was described using categories which had been used before 1917 against Jews in the bar.
When judging the post-1917 situation in the Ukrainian People's Republic and then in Soviet Ukraine one should strictly differentiate between a) personal attitudes and self-definitions and b) the political orientation of the lawyer concerned. 86 Since 1919 when the »provisional rules (polozheniia) of the People's Court of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic« were set up and the bar associations (kolegii pravozastupnykiv) were called to life, Jewish lawyers who joined the association -mostly coming from the poorer stratas of the Jewish population and having little connection with the Jewish tradition -came to an arrangement with the Soviet powers and in many respects even represented it. 87 Despite their Jewish origin, such lawyers must be considered »Soviet lawyers« as they constituted the »lawyers' collectives« during the era of forced collectivisation.
88 These conditions facilitated the ideological controversy amongst lawyers of Jewish origin holding differing opinions. 89 It is not always useful to consult the relevant statistics in this case. Thus, there were numerous lawyers that were Jewish in Ukrainian legal offices (more than 50% in the big cities of Ukraine, like Kiev, Khar'kov or Odessa), 90 but because their activities were not exclusively »Jewish«, these lawyers could, paradoxically, not be called »Jewish lawyers«.
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Lawyers who were practising their profession in the Jewish legal chambers in the Ukraine during the 1920s represented something else altogether. Here the Jewish component was more important than the confessional one, with the language (Yiddish) being its central characteristic. All advocates in the 1920s, including those in the Yiddish courts, were mostly doing business as usual -that is, they were doing what was ideologically expected of them. Accordingly, a journalist of the Ukrainian-Jewish newspaper Der Shtern critically reported that Jewish advocates were emphasizing the unbaflekte (unblemished) Proletarian past of their clients in their speeches. 92 The advocates, as was noticed by Yiddish observers, were ›Russified‹ and belonged to those lawyers who, for pragmatic reasons, had recommended that their clients use the Russian language in communicating with the authorities (e. g. at appeals). 93 The situation of Ukrainian Jewish courts was similar to that of Belorussian ones. In the notes of a reporter, the reader finds a »[…] vivid picture of the Minsk Yiddish court circa 1927, where a militsioner, speaks a ›newspaper Yiddish‹, an old advocate's ›half-Yiddish-and-half Russian‹ legalese makes the audience laugh, and another advocate, a young man, speaks a ›pure, albeit too mannered, Yiddish‹.«
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In the 1920s the ›Jewish advocate‹ had difficulty supporting the specific tasks of the socialist mission. The urban lawyers' use of ›Latin‹ meant that they were constantly misunderstood, which was a phenomenon typical of the perception of lawyers, at least in Tsarist Russia. 95 The exclamation: »the Proletarian Court is an organ of the dictatorship of the proletariat and not of the factory owner's attorney (fabrikantskogo advokata)!«, was typical in this context. 96 A certain amount of disdain towards the advocate's profession survived 1917 in Russia/Ukraine, yet it was transformed rhetorically as well as ideologically. Without a doubt the Jewish advocates themselves displayed both faces of the legal system's ›Janus head‹: one looking to the past (Russian liberal legal reform, 1864) and other looking to the future, a future in which the advocate's profession served Soviet ideology.
Conclusion
The approximately 1.5 million Jews and Jewesses living in the different regions of the Ukraine were socially, culturally and professionally distinct and had a very colourful and varying understanding of law and legality. Of course a distinction must be made between the legal understanding and legal behaviour of a working class man in Kiev in 1908, an advocate in Odessa in the events leading up to World War I and that of a colonist who in the mid1920s left their shtetl and moved to the Crimea. Nevertheless it seems possible to speak of some overarching »cultural attitudes« 97 that were held by Ukrainian Jews towards the law, which, in turn, determined their models of behaviour. These models -in differing degrees a feature of all »children of Tevye« 98 -ensured a certain, albeit conditional, continuity during a period when the semantics of ›legality‹ were accompanied by absolute lawlessness in the Soviet Union. The macro-level issues, such as the complex Tsarist jurisdiction, quickly changed and yet continued to live on as a continually weakening memory. The derivations of law -such as legality, justice and emancipation -became the object of interest for the struggles within the Jewish community, independent of social origin and political attitudes. Hybrids developed which allowed both of Janus' heads to thrive. The past was omnipresent in post-1917Jewish legal conditions. Life's needs was an indispensable part of Jews' legal argumentation (as can be seen in many petitions, legal articles, etc.), and this was not only true post-1917 when the »new life« gained the upper hand. 99 Jewish traditional law was still an essential starting point for legal debates. In 1918 (soon after the passing of the Balfour Declaration), the Zionists and Jewish lawyers Shmuel Aizenshtadt and Asher Gulak founded the association Mishpat Ivri (»Jewish law«) in Moscow to deal with issues related to the adaptation of Jewish legal understanding to the new circumstances and a »revitalization« of the traditional laws in accordance with the Zionist spirit. The association was designed to draw up the laws of the future Jewish state as well as the laws pertaining to the Jewish Diaspora with respect to the Europe-wide tendency towards autonomy for national minorities. 100 In Mishpat Ivri, people for whom the »Jewish question« was »a dream about the future« met with those who considered the »liquor trade« in Russia equally vital. 101 But the reflections about the law in the light of the halacha departed Soviet Union for decades with the people who made them, and leave the country for good or were prosecuted.
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